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Abstract 
Cost and time overruns in Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) have 
become a high-profile problem attracting the interest of Congress, government and 
watchdog groups.  According to the GAO, the 96 MDAPs from FY2008 collectively ran $296 
billion over budget and were an average of 22 months behind schedule. President Obama’s 
memo on government contracting of 4 March 2009 also highlighted this issue. 
This paper presents interim findings of research on the root causes of cost and 
schedule delays for MDAPs. This research is ongoing and will incorporate the 2010 SAR 
data. The final findings and policy recommendations will be presented at the May 2011 
Naval Post Graduate School annual Acquisition Symposium.  
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schedule delays for MDAPs. This research is ongoing and will incorporate the 2010 SAR 
data. The final findings and policy recommendations will be presented at the May 2011 
Naval Post Graduate School annual Acquisition Symposium.  
 
Figure 1. Relative Cost Growth Versus Absolute Cost Growth for FY2008 
MDAPs 
Note: Only FY2008 MDAPs with a baseline estimate beyond Milestone B in the 
September 2008 SAR were included 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
Problem Definition 
Past studies on this topic either have not offered rigorous data analysis or were 
focused on a narrow aspect of the problem, such as technical maturity.  As a result, 
acquisition reform efforts, most recently the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 
2009, are hampered by an insufficient analytical basis. 
For instance, in its annual assessment of selected weapon systems, the GAO 
primarily focuses on technology maturity and associated program decisions as causes for 
these problems. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology & Logistics 
John Young claimed in a memorandum on March 31, 2009, that many of the allegations of 
the GAO are based on inadequate analytical methods and that consequently many of the 
results are misleading.  
This disagreement is exemplary of the diverging set of opinions that exists regarding 
the root causes of MDAPs cost overruns and schedule delays. The result amplifies 
disagreement regarding potential fixes. On the government side, Senator McCain identified 
the usage of cost plus contracts as a major source for cost increases and Secretary Gates 




some MDAPs. Defense contractors, on the other hand, regularly cite the altering of 
requirements in advanced program stages as an important factor for cost increases. 
The currently ongoing process of reforming and fixing defense acquisition system still 
lacks the foundation of a detailed evaluation of the causality chain of cost overruns and 
program delays of MDAPs. This lack of understanding of underlying mechanism makes the 
design of adequate solutions inherently difficult and renders them potentially ineffective. This 
study directly aims at developing the urgently needed knowledge base that will better guide 
efforts to correct the growing trends of cost increases and schedule overruns.  
Methodology 
This brief analysis a series of variables—namely realism of baseline program cost 
estimates, government management and oversight, the role of contractors and lead military 
services, levels of competition, and contract structures—to determine what factors might 
contribute to the observed cost overruns in the execution of MDAPs. 
The research draws on four primary data sources: 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs): The SARs track Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs reporting on their schedule, unit counts, total spending, and progress through 
milestones.  The unit of analysis is the programs themselves, making it the ideal source for 
top level analysis.   
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS): The FPDS is a database of every 
government contract, with millions of entries each year.  Each entry has extensive data on 
the contractors, contract type, competition, place of performance, and a variety of other 
topics as mandated by Congress.  Cross-referencing individual contracts with MDAPs is 
possible using the system equipment codes (which match up with those of MDAPs).  This 
source provides the most in-depth data on the government contracting process. 
Department of Defense Budget Documents: In addition to budget data, these 
documents provide topical information on each MDAP and its subcomponents.  They will 
primarily be used to categorize projects as well as to support and double check spending 
figures from the other two sources. 
The initial analysis phase focuses on MDAPs from the FY2008 MDAP list. Within this 
sample group, the analysis is limited to 87 MDAPs with cost estimates set at Milestone B or 
beyond. That gate is meant to be a hurdle that requires programs to reach a certain level of 
technological maturity.  As a result Milestone B “is normally the initiation of an acquisition 
program.” This common starting point ensures that only programs in a relatively mature 
acquisition phase are compared. Unfortunately, full data is not available on all 87 MDAPs 
when examining contract type and competition because only a majority of the programs 
have at least 50% of the SARs contract value accounted for in 2004-2008 FPDS data. The 
“unclear” category is used to signify this missing data in competition and contract type 
findings. In addition, FPDS totals for program spending are sometimes higher than the 
funding status according to the SARs. In those cases, the SAR totals are treated as the 
more reliable figure. 
This preliminary snapshot provides an adequate starting point for detecting 
correlations between a series of potentially relevant factors and cost growth. Subsequent 
analysis will examine multiple factors at the same time, expand the breadth of the sample 





The initial analysis focuses on examining the impact of baseline cost estimates, 
quantity and schedule changes, as well as engineering problems; the extent of competition 
in contracts (full and open, partial, none)1; contract structure; lead branch of military service; 
and identity of prime contractor on the cost performance on MDAPs.  
 
Figure 2. Functional Reasons for Cost Growth 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives 
Group) 
Breaking down cost growth by functional areas as provided in the SARs identifies 
mistakes in the estimating process as the primary driver for cost growth, being responsible 
for $145.5 billion in cost growth for the 87 MDAPs analyzed.  
Another noteworthy observation is the fact that the cost savings achieved through 
quantity changes almost equals the cost growth originating from changes in unit numbers. 
Quantity based changes are unlike the five other types of changes as the SARs adjust the 
top-line cost overrun figures to remove the impact of quantity changes. The key distinction is 
that for programs with upfront research and development costs, reducing the number of 
units lowers the overall cost but increases the unit cost. In turn, cost increases deriving from 
increases in the number of units require a higher overall budget but lower the price per unit. 
Similarly, Nunn-McCurdy breaches are based on the growth in the acquisition unit cost and 
not the overall cost. 
                                                
1 Full competition refers to programs competed under full and open competition with at least two 
bidders. Partial competition includes all other competed contracts such as follow-ons to competed 
contracts, competitions where the number of bidders is legally limited, and full and open competition 





Figure 3. Time-cost Correlation 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives 
Group) 
The next explanatory variable examined for its impact on program performance is the 
time-cost growth correlation. If cost increases accrue over time then programs with an older 
baseline estimate would tend to accumulate relatively higher cost increases. The data for 
the analyzed programs shows that older programs indeed experience larger overruns.   
When measured in compound annual growth rate2 rather than aggregate relative 
cost growth, the time-cost growth correlation is almost constant. This does not only provide 
further evidence for the assertion that cost growth occurs steadily throughout the program 
lifespan, but it also suggests that younger programs are not performing better than older 
programs. On the other hand, this sample does not include older programs that were 
cancelled. Future research with a broadened sample set will be better able to avoid this 
confounding factor and thus provide more insight into the successes and failures of past 
reform efforts. 
                                                
2 The compound annual growth rate describes the average year-to-year cost growth of a program 
spending since its baseline. Thus if comparing two programs with same percentage of cost growth 
since their baseline estimate, the program with an earlier baseline year would have a smaller 





Figure 4. Cost Overruns by Lead Service (I) 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
The analysis on the correlation between the lead branch of military service 
responsible for MDAPs and cost growth patterns reveals that programs led by the Navy 
appear to perform best, followed by the Air Force and Army, while DoD-wide programs tend 
to accrue significant higher cost overruns. As broken down by the SARs, DoD-wide refers 
not just to programs managed by DoD agencies but also joint programs such as the Joint 
Strike Fighter. The outcome of this data analysis might be skewed based on the relatively 
small sample group utilized in this preliminary analysis. For instance, it appears that the 
DoD-wide category might be heavily influenced by the negative developments for the Joint 
Strike Fighter program. As for the other components, further analysis with larger sample 
groups are required to validate observed trends. 
Any conclusions identifying superior program management of existing programs by 
the better performing services as means of avoiding cost growth would be premature, even 
if additional data and analysis will confirm this variation in cost performance based on lead 
service. A number of other factors occurring before Milestone B may explain the differences, 
such as a tendency toward less risk-prone MDAPs or better cost estimating at the outset of 
programs. Further research will be needed to analyze the underlying causality and detect 





Figure 5. Cost Overruns by Lead Service (II) 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives 
Group) 
Comparing the share of cost growth for which each service is responsible with the 
share of contract value, based on baseline estimates, which each service is managing 
supports the poor cost performance of DoD-wide managed MDAPs. DoD-wide led programs 
are responsible for an over-proportional large share of absolute cost overruns. The picture is 
reversed for the Navy, meanwhile for the Air Force and the Army the share of cost overruns 
and is slightly larger than the share of baseline value. This comparison provides further 
support for the assertion that Navy managed MDAPs over-perform, while DoD-wide 
managed MDAPs underperform. However, the level of analysis conducted so far does not 







Figure 6. Figure 6. Cost Overruns by Prime Contractor (I) 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
Another predictor for program performance could be the identity of the prime 
contractor executing a given program. The picture becomes a lot more complex, based on 
the amount of actors involved. One striking trend that is visible for the “big five” US defense 
companies is the fact that Raytheon on average appears to deliver significantly better cost 
performance outcomes than the other four defense companies.  
Again, the preliminary character of the analysis does not fully validate these findings. 
In addition, even if confirmed, it would be premature to start praising Raytheon for superior 
program execution, as other factors such as specialization in technologically more mature 
program areas might be the true drivers behind this trend. As was the case for the 






Figure 7. Cost Overruns by Prime Contractor (II) 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
The comparison between the share of cost growth and the share of contract value for 
MDAPs, aggregated by prime contractor correlates with the finding that Raytheon managed 
MDAPs appear to exhibit the best cost performance amongst the “big five” defense 
companies. However, the above graph also shows that the respectable performance of 
Raytheon contracted MDAPs has only a marginal impact on aggregate cost growth bottom 
line due to the small contract value share of Raytheon led programs.  
 
Figure 8. Cost Overruns by Type of Competition 






Contract awarding mechanisms could potentially also have an impact on cost 
performance of MDAPs. Competitive contracts3 are outperforming contracts awarded with 
no competition or under unclear circumstances with regard to cost performance. This might 
indicate that competition either results in more realistic bids or that winning companies have 
more incentives to keep costs under control. This advantage holds for the category of partial 
competition, which includes cases open for competition but with only a single bidder, follow-
ons to competed contracts, and competitions with a legally limited pool of applicants. In fact, 
somewhat surprisingly, partially competed MDAPs appear to have lower overruns than fully 
competed ones. However, without further study, it is impossible to say whether this is due to 
benefits of partially competitive structures or is fully competitive procedures are deemed to 
be a necessary for high risk programs. 
 
Figure 9. Cost Overruns by Contract Type 
(Source: September 2008 SAR; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
Contract structure provides another possible determining factor for the performance 
of MDAPs. One key observation is that fixed price contracts appear to over-perform and 
unspecified contract types appear to under-perform when comparing the share of cost 
growth and the share of contract value for MDAPs.  
Acquisition reformers often point towards over- and misuse of cost plus contracts as 
a factor driving cost overruns.  Yet as the comparison reveals the use of cost plus contracts, 
award fee and incentive as well as conventional, seem not to be responsible for dramatically 
over-proportional cost growth. In addition, fixed price contracts are often the vehicle of 
choice for mature technology in full rate production, which are generally considered low risk.
                                                
3 Full competition refers to programs competed under full and open competition with at least two 
bidders. Partial competition includes all other competed contracts such as follow-ons to competed 
contracts, competitions where the number of bidders is legally limited, and full and open competition 






The initial analysis yielded a number of preliminary trends for determining the 
sources of cost overruns in MDAPs. One key finding from the SAR data is that overly 
optimistic cost estimating is responsible for almost half of the accumulated cost overruns. In 
fact, of all the services the Army is the only one with cost estimating not being the primary 
reason for cost growth.  
Of the tested variables, only the time-cost correlation appears to have no impact on 
cost overrun developments once accounted for on a compound annual growth rate. This 
suggests that program performance might not have been improving in recent times. If this 
trend is further validated it hints toward the concerning conclusion than any acquisition 
reform efforts prior to 2008 have so far failed to create any improvements for cost 
performance. In this context, it must, however, be noted that cost performance as measured 
in the SARs constitutes clearly a lagging indicator for the impact of any acquisition reform. In 
addition, some of the worst performing older programs of the past have already been 
cancelled and if included would increase the overrun compound annual growth rate for 
earlier years. 
The examination of all of the other examined variables reveals patterns that suggest 
that each of them, or associated secondary or tertiary factors, could play a role in explaining 
the occurrence of MDAP cost overruns. While one service may appear to have the best cost 
performance; or one company may seem to deliver fewer cost-overrun programs of the “big 
five” defense contractors; fixed price contracts appear to constitute the contract vehicle with 
the best cost growth control; and awarding contracts in a competitive fashion seems to 
ensure better cost performance than alternative awarding mechanism, all of these trends 
need to be further validated through additional analysis, incorporating larger sample groups. 
Afterwards, more rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis is required to identify the 
actual root causes for cost overruns, which might be only masked by the examined 




Conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing (ATC 2006) (pp. 500–510). 
 
Figure 10. Agile T&E 
Summary 
Information technologies evolve rapidly, as is abundantly evident in the commercial 
sector.  As the DoD acquires IT to enhance warfighting capabilities, we need to become 
more agile. Agility cannot just occur in capability development either; all aspects of the IT 
acquisition system must be redesigned for agility.  To be responsive to operational 
requirements, and to ensure the capabilities work as intended, test, evaluation, and 
certification must move at the speed of need.  The Defense Science Board reports provide a 
good starting point from which to build a new model for acquisition of IT; now, let’s take the 
next bold step to implement agile processes that deliver enhanced IT capabilities for the 
warfighter.     
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